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A POST-CAPITALIST, POST-STALINIST SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: HUNGARY 1 956 and 1990 
by Leslie A. Muray 
Dr. Leslie A ,  Muray (Episcopalian) is a professor at Lansing Community College in 
Michigan. Born in Hungary, he came to the U.S.A. as a young boy. He received his 
Ph.D. degree at Claremont Graduate Theogical School in California. He is the editor 
of the C.A.R.E.E. Newsletter on the Christian-Marxist Encounter. This paper 
presented at the "Marxism and Religion" seminar, at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Academy of Religion, November 1 9, 1 990. 
It is rather commonplace to hear that there is no tradition of democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Focusing on resources provided by history, religion, and certain aspects of 
Marxist thought for the construction of a non-capitalist, post-Stalinist society in the country 
of the author's birth, Hungary, I hope to dispel this Western European and North American 
stereotype in this essay. 
The first section deals with the rich, although ambiguous, resources, images, metaphors 
of the Hungarian national heritage in its nearly perpetual struggle for national independence 
and democracy. The second section explores religious developments in the post-World War 
II era and those of its aspects that are potentially helpful to the constructive tasks at hand. 
In the third section, I treat the ambiguous heritage of Marxism, seeing the legacy of George 
Lukacs and the radical democratic socialism of the Budapest Circle as further resources. The 
fourth section describes briefly the major events of the revolution of 1 956. In the fifth 
section, I consider the revolution 1 956 and the· vision of Imre Nagy, sketchy as it is, as the 
most important and greatest resources for the present and the future· in the construction of 
a non-capitalist, non-Stalinist democratic society. An anti-authoritarian, democratic, 
socialist, struggle for national independence that called into question the bipolar structure of 
the post-World War II world, the revolution of 1 956 upheld in a unique way a vision of 
political and economic democracy that guaranteed minimal standards of socio-politico­
cultural welfare in a pluralistic society. 
I. 
The recently formed Republic of Hungary reinstated the crown of St. Stephen (removed 
from "the Kossuth seal" during the revolution of 1 848 and preferred ever since by many 
2 1  
Hungarians of democratic inclinations) on the traditional seal of Hungary. Easily one of the 
most beloved figures in Hungarian history, St. Stephen (r. 997 - 1 038)) unified the Magyar 
(the Hungarian word for "Hungarian") tribes and converted his people to Christianity. In a 
manner reminiscent of Charlemagne, he was crowned on Christmas Day 1 000. The crown of 
St. Stephen has since served as a symbol of legitimacy, the power of which is illustrated by 
the tremendous outpouring of emotion by people on both sides of the issue on the occasion 
of its return to Hungary in 1 978 .  
Although Hungary adopted the feudal social structure of the rest of Europe during the 
reign of Stephen, it was not nearly as rigid and restrictive. Serfs (the "jobbagy") had the right 
to move and were not tied to the land or particular nobles. In his written advice to his son, 
Stephen urges him to seek the advice of the elders and his laws mention a "Senatus" as well 
as the need to consult the "tota communitas" on issues of national importance--the embryonic 
form of what later became the feudal Diet, quite powerful during various periods of the 
Middle Ages.1 Of course, the membership of the feudal Diet was restricted to the 
landowning nobility. However, the seeds for greater inclusiveness and the easing of 
qualifications for membership were sowed by Stephen himself. 
While the traditional alliance between the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church and 
the political power structure began during his reign, Stephen himself appropriated another 
side of the tradition that is important to Hungarian religious culture, particularly in popular 
religious piety. Quite capable of cruelty to his opponents, his historical popularity is no small 
measure due to his sense of fairness and justice toward the poor and oppressed. 
Among the early kings of Hungary, most notable for their dynastic feuds following the 
death of St. Stephen, St. Laszlo (r. I 077 - 1  095) justly stands out for reunifying the nation and 
a legendary, chivalrous sense of solidarity with the defenseless, the poor and the oppressed2 
--much of it, once again, due to his particular appropriation and understanding of the 
Christian tradition. 
The best example from the Middle Ages of the appropriation of that aspect of the 
Christian tradition which takes the side of the poor and the oppressed is St. Elizabeth of 
Hungary ( 1 207- 1 23 1 ) , with Louis of France the patron of the Third Order Franciscans. 
1Hamik, K Peter, ed. ,  One Thousand Years: A Concise History of Hungary, (Budapest: Corvina, 
1 988), pp. 1 9-20; Macartney, C.A., Hungary: A Short History, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 
1 962), p. 14 .  The following historical account, corroborated by two sources of very diverse points 
of view, is largely the result of my internalization and interpretation of Hungarian history. 
Unfortunately, I no longer remember many of my sources, in Hungarian and English, read years 
ago. It will probably surprise most Americans to know that most Hungarian children are familiar with 
this history by the age of ten at least my first grade class was in 1955-56. 
2Macartney, Hungary, p .  20. 
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Married to Louis IV, Landgrave of Thuringia, attracted to the Franciscans, she sold her 
jewels, established a hospital, opened the royal granaries and cared for the sick and the poor 
in person during a famine and epidemic in 1 226. Following the death of her husband, she 
became the first Third Order Franciscan and spent the rest of her life tending to the poor 
and the sick.3 In Elizabeth, we find a powerful symbol for one dimension of the religious 
heritage of Hungary: whatever early social services were undertaken, hospitals, schools, etc. 
were sponsored by the church; the impetus· for social reforms had religious roots, especially 
among those clergy and members of religious orders who lived among the poor and the 
oppressed - contradicting the support of the hierarchy for the feudal power structure, and 
later, for the Habsburg monarchy. 
The history of Hungary is replete with numerous struggles for national independence and 
for the extension of freedom to an increasingly larger segment of its population. One of the 
high points in the extension of freedom during the Middle Ages was the Golden Bull of 
1 222, resembling the Magna Carta and following it by a few years, restricting the power of 
the monarchy, mandating consultation with the feudal Diet, and reserving the right of the 
nobility to resist the monarchy if the provisions of the Bull were violated.4 The period 
following the brutal Mongolian invasion by Batu's Golden Horde in 1 24 1  saw a prolonged 
power struggle between the kings, and the barons, the upper or higher nobility. As a result 
of this power struggle, the power of the lesser nobility and the feudal Diet increased.5 
The long range result was the election of Matyas Hunyadi (r. 1 458- 1 490), whose father 
Janos Hunyadi had been regent and decisively defeated the Ottoman Turks, as king by the 
lesser nobility, including some who while retaining their titles because of financial hardship 
had become serfs, on the ice of the frozen Danube in 1 458 .  While, to be sure, the franchise 
was limited, it was considerably more inclusive than it had been in the past. In Hungarian 
history, the election of Matyas is one of the most emotionally powerful images of a nascent 
democracy. 6 
Matyas is revered as a military hero, a Renaissance king who was a patron of the arts and 
sciences. While dominating the Diet by the force of his personality, he did abide by its 
decisions and took its advice seriously. Most importantly, he is a legendary embodiment of 
wisdom who travelled throughout the land in disguise to find out how his subjects really 
3Lesser Feats and Fasts, Third Edition, (New York: The Church Hymnal Corporation, 1 980), p. · 
384. 
4Hanak, p. 25; Macartney, pp. 26-27. 
5Hanak, pp. 28-32; Macartney, pp. 28-53. 
6Hanak, pp. 34-36; Macartney, pp. 54-59. 
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lived, siding with the serfs in their quest for justice. He was no less legendary for his 
satirical humor, usually aimed at the oppressive practices of the upper nobility. 7 
The plight of the peasants worsened following the death of Matyas as both the barons and 
the monarchy sought to reassert control. In 1 5 1 4, when an army of peasants recruited for a 
Crusade by Franciscans who lived with the serfs and advocated a peasant kingdom was 
ordered to disband by the king, a bloody rebellion erupted. The peasant rebellion was 
brutally repressed and its leader, Gyorgy D6zsa, was burned alive on a red hot iron throne. 
Following the rebellion, for the first time legislation perpetually binding peasants to 
particular lands and depriving them of the right to own it was enacted.8 
D6zsa's rebellion provides another illustration of the ambiguous role of religion in 
Hungarian history; while the hierarchy, part of the landowning class and possessor of great 
wealth, supported the preservation of the feudal social structure, it was the Franciscans, 
sharing the life of the peasants, who sowed the seeds of rebellion. Except for the most rabid 
reactionaries who yearn for the "Golden Age" of feudalism, "illud tempore," to most Magyars 
D6zsa's rebellion is a symbol of the yearning for liberation from all forms of oppression. 
Following the annihilation of the Magyar army by the Ottoman Turks at the battle of 
Moluics in 1 526, Hungary was divided into three parts: Habsburg ruled Western Hungary, 
Turkish occupied Central Hungary, and a supposedly autonomous but in effect an Ottoman 
protectorate in the East, dominated by Transylvania. A number of events and several figures 
from this time period are significant for the development of social democracy in Hungary. 
During the sixteenth century, much of Hungary converted to Protestantism, the Calvinist 
oriented Reformed Church in particular. This was due in no small measure to the defection 
of Franciscans, the most popular religions order, who saw the consonance between such 
principles as the priesthood of all believers and their egalitarian ideals. Although the 
overwhelming majority of Magyars returned to the Roman Catholic fold in the seventeenth 
century, largely on account of the work of Peter Paznuiny, Arbishop of Esztergom, 
Protestantism has remained a significant factor in Hungarian life and has become a very 
special embodiment of the spirit of national independence.9 
As the Habsburgs sought to impose a reign of terror in Transylvania in the latter part of 
the sixteenth century, Istvan Bocskai, the noble who owned the most land in the east, led a 
rebellion with an army consisting largely of "hajdus," peasants who had fled either Turkish 
occupation or the oppression of the nobles. After driving the Habsburg armies out of 
8Hanak, p. 42; Macartney, p. 62. 
9Hanak, p. 54; Macartney, pp. 76-77. 
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Transylvania: and Upper Hungary,· he concluded the Treaty of Vienna, which guaranteed the 
observance of the provisions of the traditional constitution, the right of the Diet to enact 
legislation, and, perhaps most significantly, freedom of religion, which in Transylvania had 
already been proclaimed in 1 550. 1,3ocskai settled 1 0,000 hajdus on his own estates, and the 
Hungarian aristocracy established other hajdu settlements whose inhabitants were free, did 
not have to. pay taxes and were not encumbered by the typical feudal obligations of the 
peasants.10 
The most remarkable figure during this period was Gabor Bethlen, who was Prince of 
Transylvania from 1 6 1 3  to 1 629. A brilliant military tactician during the Thirty Years War, 
who led his troops into battle in person, was never defeated and helped establish the 
· international reputation of the Hungarian hussars, he was also a crafty diplomat In domestic 
politics, while he did not abolish the institution of perpetual serfdom, in a manner 
reminiscent of Matyas, he did attempt to ensure justice for the peasants. He established a 
university to which all Hungarian clergy and scholars were welcome. Most importantly, with 
lasting historical consequences, for the first time, he made it possible for peasants to acquire 
an education.11  
Following the expulsion of the Turks in 1 686, and the Treaty of Karlowitz ( 1 699), 
Hungary came under the absolutist and despotic domination of the Habsburgs, who· violated 
their prior agreements to allow a degree , autonomy, observe freedom of religion, rule 
according to the traditional constitution, and respect the right of the Diet to enact legislation; 
The hierarchical feudal social order became increasingly rigid and the plight of the peasants 
grew increasingly worse.12 
The revolution Ferenc Rakoczi led against these oppressive conditions is one of the two 
(three if one includes th� revolutiqn of 1 956, which I shall treat later) paradigmatic struggles 
for · national inqependence and democracy. For a war of national independence to be 
successful, the various Hungarian social classes needed to be united. Historically, these 
struggles were led by the nobles. One of the typical strategies of foreign rulers and their 
· allies among the aristocracy was to undermine the loyalty of the serfs to their rebellious 
masters. 
10 Hanak, pp. 55-57; Macartney, pp. 78-80. To avoid using a double plural form in two 
languages, I have added an "s" to the singular form of the word "hajdu." The plural in Hungarian is 
"hajduk." Hanak's translation is "heyduck," which seems very awkward to me, while Macartney uses 
the .double plural and transliterated "hayduks." 
· 
11Hanak, pp. 57-59; M�cartney, pp. 80-82. 
12Hanak, pp. 58-74; Macartney, pp: 84-92. 
25' 
Initially, Rakoczi's army was made of the "kuruc,"13 peasants who had fought alternately 
the Habsburgs and then the Turks for national independence and the improvement of their 
socio-politico-economic conditions. Guaranteed their traditional privileges by Habsburg 
rule, the nobility was initially suspicious of what to them appeared to be a lower class rabble. 
Nevertheless, the nobles joined Rakoczi in 1 707. The Magyars had never been so united. In 
spite of this unity, the kuruc army was finally defeated in 1 7 1 1 ,  and Rakoczi died as an exile 
in Turkey ( 1 735).14 
Rakoczi adopted the color white, bordered by red and green, a variation of the 
Hungarian red-white-green tricolor, for his flag. In the middle was the inscription, the 
motto of the revolution, "Cum Deo pro patria et libertate" ("with God for country and 
liberty"), most often above a likeness of the Virgin Mary. Jesus and Mary, understood by 
popular piety to embody God's ultimate solidarity with the oppressed, have since been seen 
as the patrons of the struggles for national independence and democracy - images that have 
energized popular uprisings_IS 
Before turning to the second paradigmatic struggle for national independence and 
democracy, the revolution of 1 848, I shall allude to the previously mentioned typically 
contradictory and ambigous tendencies in Hungarian religious life. On the one hand, both 
the Roman Catholic and Reformed Churches continued to possess great wealth and huge 
parcels of land. The Roman Catholic hierarchy had made a rather unholy alliance with the 
Roman Catholic Habsburgs. The contrary tendency is illustrated during this time period by 
the intriguing figure of Ignac Martinovics. 
A Franciscan scholar with political ambitions, Martinovics, Abbott of Szaszvar at the 
time, became a spy for the reform-minded Habsburg monarch, Leopold II (r. 1 790-92). 
When Leopold died and the archconservative Francis I succeeded him, Martinovics organized 
a plot to overthrow the Habsburgs and transform the socio-politico-economic structure. · The 
conspiracy was uncovered and under interrogation,  its leader revealed the details of the plot 
13The word "kuruc" originated from the time of D6zsa's rebellion. 
14Hanak, pp. 74- 8 1 ;  Macartney, pp. 92-93. 
15The degree to which the images of Mary and Jesus as patrons of revolutionary struggles for 
liberation have penetrated theHungarian psyche cannot be minimized. Speaking personally, even 
though my theological education, in fact all of my education since the fifth grade, has been in the . 
United States, my first readings of liberation theology, with its focus on the image of Jesus as 
Liberator, immediately struck a responsive chord--memories of Rakoczi's flag and my appropriation 
of a nearly selective biblical literalism concerning the teachings of Jesus about the rich and the poor 
and his identification with the oppressed acquired primarily from my parents and catechetical 
instruction in Hungary. Although I had a plurality of images of Jesus, it did not even occur to me 
that there were people who did not see Jesus as Liberator--unless, of course, one was a feudalist in 
whatever cultural, geographical, racial, ethnic, historical context! 
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and the names of his co-conspirators. Martinovics and six ·others were executed, numerous 
others imprisoned in th·e crackdown that followed.16 
The second great paradigmatic struggle for national independence and democracy was the 
revolution of !"848. Inspired by Sandor Petofi's poem, the "Nemzeti Dal" (National Song­
actually a poem), urging Magyars to stand up, throw off their shackles, and grab their swords 
to resist tyranny, 17 crowds demanded and the Diet acceded to the abolishment of feudalism, 
serfdom, the relinquishment of the titles and privileges of the nobility, and the guarantee of 
democratic freedoms. To avoid the imminent financial hardship that would befall the lower 
nobility in particular with the abol.lshment serfdom, the Diet agreed to compensate the 
landowning aristocracy for their loss of income. Initially the government tried to reach a 
-
-
compromise with the Habsburg monarchy; eventually, the Magyar government declared 
independence, and had it not been for the intervention of Russia, requested by the young 
emperor Franz Joseph, the Magyar army, which was then engaged in a successful 
c�unteroffensive, might have won. 18 
Along with some of the generals executed in the ensuing reign of terror and other 
military figures, PetOfi and Lajos Kossuth, the Regent, were the legendary heroes of the 
revolution. A romantic poet influenced by the ideals of the French Revolution, Petofi, a 
major in the revolutionary army, in a manner reminiscent of another romantic poet, Lord 
Byron, was killed (his body was never found) by Russian troops at the battle of Segesvar. 
After the defeat of the revolution in 1 849, Kossuth went into exile, eventually settling in 
Italy, to his dying day uncompromising in his opposition to the Habsburgs. Between 1 85 1  
and 1 853, he lived in the United States, where h e  was greeted with empathy and acclaim: 
4,000 towns were named after him, and · he was seen as the George Washington of his 
country. Accordingly, as a gesture of solidarity, Congress voted to give him Washington's 
sword, which to this day, resides in the National Museum in Budapest. 
Kossuth was very much a child of the Enlightenment. Yet, he was also a devout member 
of the Reformed Church; his egalitarian democratic principles, in his own estimation, were 
in large measure inspired by his faith. It is often said the Revolutions of 1 848 that swept 
Europe were middle class, bourgeois revolutions. While the democratic freedoms and the 
anti-feudal character of the Hungarian revolution of 1 848 had much in common with th� 
ideals of the bourgeois revolutions of France and Prussia, it was hardly a middle class 
revolution. With virtually no middle class .in an essentially feudal society, the revolutionary 
16Hamik, pp. 94-95; Macartney, pp. 127 .  
171 am paraphrasing my own translation from the Hungarian. 
18Hamik, pp. 1 1 4- 1 2 1 ;  Macartney, pp. 1 55- 1 70. 
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army was comprised of peasants, much like Rakoczi's kuruc troops; and the country led and 
inspired by radical nobles like Kossuth and radical intellectuals like PetOfi. 
Following the reign of terror and the passive resistance of the Magyars, Ferenc Deak, "A 
Haza Bolcse" ("the county's or homeland's wise one"), designed the Compromise of 1 867, in 
effect creating a "dualist" state. The Austrian Empire became the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
with common foreign,  defense, and finance ministries, but separate, autonomous 
governments and parliaments. While the franchise was restricted and trade unions and 
socialist parties outlawed, there was a form of parliamentary democracy, representing a 
variety of points of view, including that of the Party of Independence, which was the largest 
of a bloc of minority parties that even won the election of 1 905.19 Nevertheless, the feudal 
structure was largely intact, and the economic conditions of the peasants, lower nobility, and 
relatively small urban working class declined. Fortunately, forms of national health care; 
unemployment insurance, and social security were enacted as early as the 1 870's. 
Hungary underwent a cultural renaissance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The outstanding figure and symbol of this cultural renaissance was Endre Ady 
( 1 877- 19 19). Not only did he revitalize Hungarian poetry, Ady had a unique ability to 
express the joys, sorrows, aspirations of the poor and the oppressed. Educated in the West, 
he was a passionate, egalitarian advocate of social democracy.20 
A tragically aborted attempt at democratic social reform, and as such an untapped 
resource for the development of social democracy, can be seen in the short lived government 
Mihaly Karolyi at the end of World War I. With military defeat imminent, he came to power 
in October, 1 9 1 8 . When Emperor Charles IV renounced all participation in affairs of state 
in November, Karolyi, a noble and a leader of the Independence Party, embarked on a 
program of reform that sought to establish Hungary's independence, a separate peace treaty, 
universal suffrage with secret ballot, land reform and redistribution, and recognition of the 
rights of national minorities. He was a role model for the land reforms he attempted to 
enact. When it became evident that the Allies and the former national minorities, Czechs, 
Slovaks, Romanians, Croatians, and Serbs had reneged on their promises regarding Hungary's 
territorial integrity, compounded by problems of massive unemployment, shortages of food 
and heating fuel, inflation, Karolyi's government collapsed in March, 1 9 1 9. It was replaced 
by a short lived Soviet Republic under the leadership of Bela Kun (March-August, 1 9 1 9). 
Sometimes romanticized, particularly in later Socialist Workers' Party propaganda, Kun's 
Soviet Republic is remembered by most Magyars (except for emigre participants) as a brutal 
reign of terror. Unfortunately, eventhough the Treaty of Trianon, through which Hungary 
19Hanak, pp. 1 22- 1 7 1 ;  Macartney, pp. 1 82. 
20Hanak, pp. 1 65 - 1 67; Macartney, pp. 1 82. 
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lost two thirds of its territory, was not signed until 1 920, Karolyi has been traditionally held 
accountable. Unfairly and inaccurately (he had Bela Kun jailed!), he has at times been 
blamed for the rise of the Soviet Republic. 21 
. The period between the World Wars was typically full of ambiguity. The "Red Terror" 
was followed by a period of "White Terror." Becoming regent in 1 920, Admiral H6rthy was 
the focal point. of the Magyars' yearning to alleviate their felt national humiliation and 
aspirations to restore lost territory and prestige. Sometimes stereotyped as a fascist in 
Western Europe and the United State, he was in fact a moderating influence in the 1 930s and 
1 940s. Eventhough anti-Jewish legislation had been passed in the 1 930s, he personally 
fought the deportation of Jews until his dismissal by Hitler and the ascent to power of the 
. 
. 
Arrow Cross, the Hungarian fascist party in 1 944 . .While the franchise was restricted and the 
p�rameters of political discourse limited, (the Communist Party was outlawed, many 
' Communists inprisoned, some executed, usually on charges of sabotage), a limited form of 
parliamentary democracy was in place, and a degree of accommodation was reached with the 
peasants and workers, even with the Social Democrats who had united with the Communists 
during the days of the Soviet Republic. Reform minded parties such as the lndepended 
Smallholders' Party, representing . mostly peasants with small parcels land, exerted a 
considerable degree of influence. 22 An interesting figure early in this period is Ottokar 
Proh:iszka ( 1 858- 1 927), Bishop of Szekesfehervar and a university professor. A spellbinding 
orator capable of outbursts of anti-Semitism, he was a leader of the Christian Socialist 
movement and represented the Christian Unity Party in Parliament. Three of his works were 
condemned for modernism. 
In the aftermath of the expulsion of the Nazis and occupation by Soviet armies, a 
. coalition government, including several members close to H6rthy, came to power in 1 945. In 
the November, 1 945 elections, participation was restricted to parties that were coalition 
members (i .e.,  the Social Democrats, Smallholders, National Peasants, the "Progressive 
Bourgeoisie," with fascist parties outlawed). Suffrage was universal, and with 57% of the 
vote, the Smallholders won a clear majority. Unfortunately, they were not allowed to form 
a government, leaving the coalition only temporarily in power, and tragically paving the way 
for the . advent of Rakosi's brand of Stalinism.23 
21Hamik, pp. 1 77- 1 89; Macartney, pp. 203-207. 
22Hamik, pp. 1 9 1 -23 1 ;  Macartney, pp. 209�235. 
23Hanak, pp. 234-235; Macartney, pp. 236-238. 
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II .  
The complex and ambiguous role of religion in Hungary during the post-World War II  
period is dealt with in general terms in this section. 
The responses of the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches, primarily the Reformed 
and Lutheran, to Communist rule were quite different. After the Communist Party came to 
power in the late 1 940's, church properties were confiscated, religious orders disbanded, · 
clergy imprisoned, tortured, and even executed. J6zsef Cardinal Mindszenty, Archbishop of 
Esztergom and Primate of Hungary, the traditionally powerful see of the Roman Catholic 
church in Hungary, was tried and imprisoned. 
The historical ambiguities of Hungarian religious life can be seen in the figure of 
Mindszenty. A taciturn, rigid anti-Communist, premodern in his theology, authoritarian, 
sympathetic to the traditional feudal socio-politico-economic structure, he was compassionate 
toward the poor and the oppressed, defending them with the same vehemence he opposed 
Matyas Rakosi's Stalinism. Virtually unknown is the permission he granted to pregnant 
Hungarian nuns, raped by Russian soldiers, to get abortions! 
During the Rakosi era, anti-Communist elements in the Reformed and Lutheran churches 
were replaced by leaders of a more accomodationist bent. As a result, the Protestant 
churches, relatively speaking, gained more "privileges." Within the Protestant churches, 
"Peace Priests" (I am translating the expression from the Hungarian), were in positions of 
prominence; a small group was active in Roman Catholic circles. "Peace Priests" and the term 
"peace" has become synonymous with accomodation to the regime not only in Hungary but 
in Eastern Europe as a whole. As pointed out eloquently by various issues of Sojourners over 
the last few years, the term "peace activist" has vastly different connotations in the countries 
formerly known as the Eastern bloc than in the West. It  is more than unfortunate that for 
many in the Hungarian and other Eastern European immigrant communities, the term "peace 
activist" automatically conjures images of Communist dupes and fellow travellers, a tragic 
hangover of the Stalinist era. 
During the revolution of 1956, the leadership of the Protestant church was replaced by 
persons untainted by association with the Stalinist regime. Following the defeat of the 
revolution, the new Protestant bishops and other church leaders once again took a more 
accommodating stance toward the newly installed Kadar government. 
During the late 1 960s and early 1970s, "the theology of servanthood," of "diakonia," 
espoused by the Hungarian Protestant churches, was generally perceived as a rather creative 
response to living in a socialist society. Emphasizing a confessional stance, encouraging the 
privatization of religious life, these theologies did attempt to grapple with the issue of how 
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Christians can function appropriately as citizens of a socialist socio-politico-economic order. 
They also reflec::ted the churche's' concern with institutional maintenance. 
Following Cardinal Mindszenty's departure from the American embassy in 1 97 1 ,  where 
he had lived since the suppression of the revolution of 1 956, the Roman Catholic Church, 
prompted by the urging of the Vatican, sought a modus vivendi with the existing regime. 
The Kadar regime was open to the overtures. While drawing on the openness and worldly 
activity affirming documents of Vatican II, Roman Catholicism assumed an uncharacteristic 
inward looking confessional stance, concentrating on life within the circle of faith and 
institutional maintenance� No less than for the Protestant churches, the focus of attention 
was on how one could function appropriately as a Christian in a socialist society.24 
In the new Hungary that is emerging, most Magyars are somewhat skeptical of the 
accomodationism of the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches, seeing it as evidence of 
the historical proclivity of the respective hierarchies to accommodate any existing regime. 
Yet, the popular piety that has spurred the yearning for freedom so often in the past is 
largely intact, and, in fact, has taken new, creative, novel forms. For example, the late 1960s 
and the 1 970s saw the emergence of the Hungarian version of "base communities," 
particularly in the Roman Catholic Church. The issue on which many of the base 
communities focused was that of conscientious objection to military service. Given 
Hungary's numerous struggles for national independence and freedom, this is an issue rather 
foreign to its religious and political heritage. The government and the hierarchies of the 
churches opposed conscientious objection. For members of the base communities, the issue 
became the focal point for dissent both against the government and the accomodationism of 
the religious hierarchies. 25 
In the new Hungary that is emerging, confiscated church properties are being returned 
a:nd a great emphasis placed on religious instruction. Given the insoluble link between 
Hungarian culture and its religious heritage, religion will play a vital, if uncertain, role in 
the formation of social democracy. 
III 
The legacies of the Soviet Republic of Bela Kun and the Stalinism of Rakosi and Gero 
in the 1 950s, with their reigns of terror, are not adequate resources for the development of 
· '24I want to inject a tone of humility to the previous discussion. After all, I have lived outside 
of Hungary since the age of eight and did not have to face the press1,1res Hungarian religious leaders 
have �ad to face! 
25Klippenstein, Lawrence, "Father Bulanyi and the Pacifist Controversy in Hungary, 1976-87 ," 
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, Vol .IX, No. I ,  (February 1 989), pp. 9-28. 
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social democracy in contemporary Hungary. The legacy of Janos Kadar (r. l 956- 1 988) is far 
more complex. 
Initially unaffectionately nicknamed "the butcher of Budapest" after the brutal 
suppression of the revolution of 1 956, he acquired the reputation of being a reformer. Even 
among the most vehemently anti-Communist elements of the Hungarian immigrant 
community in· the United States, he came to be seen as a skillful politician who managed a 
careful balancing act, supporting Soviet foreign policy unequivocally in return for non­
interference in Hungarian domestic affairs and reforms. Since his fall from power in 1 988 
and death in 1 989, a more critical view has resurfaced and become more public. Clearly, a 
large number of people were executed in the aftermath of the suppression of the revolution. 
In conversations with diplomats at the Hungarian Embassy in October, 1 989, I was told that 
"Kadarist paternalism" was antiquated and that his regime had made numerous mistakes, 
perhaps reflecting the then latest party line. At a conference on human rights in late 
September and October, 1 989, in Washington, D.C., the Hungarian participants, reflecting 
a wide variety of political positions, most of them former Marxists, maintained an 
overwhelmingly negative assessment of Kadar: an ill educated, inept leader, unable to 
harmonize the competing factions of the party and to control "the hard liners," under whom 
repression never stopped, just took a different form. We are probably too close to the Kadar 
era to formulate any kind of adequate assessment. The Hungarian people, however, seem to 
have reached a verdict during the recent elections, electing only the Harvard educated Miklos 
Nemet from the former Socialist Worker's [Communist] Party, renamed Socialist--and he was 
elected as an independent! 
One resource Marxism provides for the construction of social democracy in Hungary is 
the legacy of George Lukacs. This is not an unambiguous legacy. Deputy Commissar of 
Education during the Soviet Republic of 1 9 1 9, he went into exile following its demise, first 
in Vienna, then from 1 929 in the Soviet Union during the worst days of Stalin's purges. 
Upon his return to Hungary, he was politically active until Rakosi's brutal purges, after 
which he was preoccupied with strictly literary and philosophical endeavors. During the 
revolution of 1 956, he served as Minister of Culture, although he never went to his office, 
and as a member of the Central Committee voted against Hungary's departure from the 
Warsaw Pact for both ideological and pragmatic reasons. Arrested afterwards, his 
international stature prevented his execution. Although he asked for immediate 
reinstatement, he was expelled from the party during the years 1 957-67. Forbidden from 
publishing in Hungary, the Kadar regime showed a marked ambivalence toward him for the 
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remainder of his life. Critics consider him an unrepetent Stalinist, 26 admirers a reform 
minded, democratic anti-Stalinist.27 In the estimation of former pupil and Lukacs disciple 
Agnes Keller, both are right. 28 
Critical of Stalinism, later in life, Lukacs saw Stalinist Soviet Union as the only reliable 
bulwark against Nazism.29 Within the framework of an absolute existential commitment to 
Marxism and the Communist Party, he sought what he described as a democratic form of 
Communism.30 In his classic History and Class Consciousness, which was condemned by the 
party, he wrote about themes similar to those of the manuscripts of the young Marx before 
these were discovered, particularly evident in the parallel between Lukacs' notion of 
reification and Marx's theory of alienation. He advocated grassroots, participatory workers' 
councils (one of the ideas for which his work was condemned), the spontaneous formation 
of which was one of the most important and unique features for the revolution of 1 956. 
Toward the end of his life, Lukacs rejected History and Class Consciousness, not as one of 
his nearly perpetually coerced, acts of self -criticism, but on account of what he saw as its 
one sided emphasis on class instead of a focus on species-life, a realistic view of nature, and 
the relationship between the individual and society, which under the influence of the young 
Marx he came to view as the authentic preoccupation of Marxism. The party's initial refusal 
to readmit him on the grounds that he had abandoned the class struggle in favor of the 
struggle for democracy may not have been too far off the mark.31 
Perhaps most importantly, Lukacs was the intellectual "godfather" and inspiration of the 
neo-Marxist intellectuals who sowed the seeds of the revolution. As with the ideas of Adam 
Schaff in Poland, Lukacs' ideas about reification and democratic Communism, along with the 
young Marx's theory of alienation, were used for a devastating critique of a system that 
claimed to have overcome alienation. In a way, Lukacs is the intellectual symbol of the 
revolution of 1 956. 
26See for example, Kolakowski, Leszek, Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origins. Growth and 
Dissolution. Vol. 3: The Breakdown, (New York:Oxford University Press, 1 987), p·p. 253-307. 
27Heller, Agnes, "Lukacs' Later Philosphy," in Heller, Agnes,Lukacs Revalued, (Oxford, England: 
Basil Blackwell Publishers Limited, 1 983 ), p. 1 78 .  
28Ibid. 
29Lukacs, George, Record of a Life: Autobiographical Sketch, edited by Istvan Eorsi, (London, 
England: Verso Editions, 1 983),  p. 1 06 .  
30Ibid. ,  p. 1 34.  
31Fekete, Eva, and Karadi, Eva, Gyorgy Lukacs: His Life in Pictures arid Documents, (Budapest, 
Hungary: Corvina Kiado, 1 98 1  ), p. 229. 
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The legacy of Lukacs was carried on by the Budapest Circte, consisting of Marxist 
academics some of whom were former students and others who were profoundly influenced 
by him. Following the repressive crackdown of 1 972-73, the participants of this group were 
dismissed from their academic positions and exiled. Its most important members are Agnes 
Heller, her husband Ferenc Feher, and Gyorgy Markus (who was not one of Lukacs's 
students, but influenced by him). Being radical democratic socialists, the Budapest Circle 
has been equally critical of the totalitarianism of the former Eastern bloc and exploitative 
capitalism of the West as betrayals of authentic democracy.32 
Since they have lived outside of Hungary for so long, it is doubtful that the thought of 
the members of the Budapest Circle will have much of an impact outside of intellectual 
circles. Nevertheless, their perceptive and profoundly moving analysis of the revolution of 
1956 sheds much light on the direction contemporary Hungary is heading, and reinforces my 
very youthful memories and later adult interpretations of these events. It is to the revolution 
and the vision of Imre Nagy as the greatest resources for the construction of social democracy 
in Hungary that I now turn. 
IV. 
To consider the legacy of the revolution of 1 956, we need to recap briefly its major 
events. The stage was set in June, 1 953, when, three months after the death of Stalin, his 
Hungarian pupil, Rakosi, was sacked as Prime Minister by the Soviet Party hierarchy in favor 
of Imre Nagy. A prisoner of war in Russia during World War I, he became a party member 
following the Bolshevik Revolution. He was an exile in the Soviet Union until the Soviet 
occupation of Hungary. A self-taught agricultural expert, he was a reformer who favored 
land redistribution instead of orthodox collectivization.  
Rakosi was still head of the party, and the party apparatus was largely comprised of his 
Stalinist loyalists. Nagy was stripped of his official positions in April, 1 955, accused of 
"rightist deviation," and later expelled from the party. The seeds of revolution were sowed 
by the Petofi Circle, a group of Hungarian writers, all members of the party profoundly 
influenced by Lukacs, who exposed crimes committed during the reign of terror and the 
Rakosi regime's responsibility for them. To compound the government's problem, 
Khushshev's speech at the 20th Party Congress condemning the crimes of Stalin were 
32For representative works of the Budapest Circle see especially the writings of Agnes Heller and . 
Ferenc Feher, See for example, Feher, Ferenc, and Heller, Agnes, Hungary 1 956 Revisited: The 
Message of a Revolution - A Quarter of a Century After, (London, England:George Allen and 
Union); Heller, Agnes, Beyond Justice (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1 989); Heller, Agries, 
A Radical Philosophy (New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1 984). · 
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perceived as an indirect slap at Rakosi's leadership. Furth-er aggravating the situation was 
the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement--with Tito demanding the sacking of those responsible 
for the Hungarian anti-Yugoslav campaign. 
The Poznan riots in Poland in June, I 956, precipitated the appointment of Gomulka as 
First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party. When, dubious about the loyalty of the new 
regime, the Soviet army surrounded Warsaw, the Pet6fi Circle and university students 
organized a solidarity rally on October 22. Demands for the reinstatement of Imre Nagy as 
Prime Minister and the democratization of Hungary were made. On October 23, over 
300,000 people demonstrated initially for Nagy's reinstatement but rapidly started to make 
more radical demands for national independence and democracy. 
There can be little doubt about the genuine popularity of Imre Nagy. As Prime Minister, 
he stopped the repression and the collectivization of the farms.33 Nagy was asked to pacify 
the crowd, very briefly damaging h is  pol i tical reputation. When Erno Gero, who had 
succeeded Rakosi in July (to Magyars, Rakosi and Gero were "six of one, half a dozen of the 
other"), made a virulent and threatening radio speech, demonstrators descended on the station 
to make a rebuttal. Members of the hated and feared A VH, the secret police, who were 
guarding the building, fired upon the crowd, killing four people. Armed by this time, the . 
demonstrators laid siege to the radio station and captured it. The larger group of 
demonstrators had gone to the gigantic statue of Stalin and tore it down--a  symbol of 
defiance. 34 
Imre Nagy was reinstated as Prime Minister in the middle of the night. On October 25, 
after a group demonstrating against official charges of "counter-revolution" was massacred 
by the A VH, events in Hungary became unmanageable.35 Gero was forced to resign. During 
days of fierce fighting, which saw the defection of some Russian troops to the side of the 
freedom fighters, Nagy announced Hungary's departure from the Warsaw Pact and the 
country's neutral status. He invited non-communist politicians into his cabinet, and formed 
a coalition with the newly legalized Social Democratic, Peasant, and Smallholder parties. He 
promised elections in a plurastic society. On October 30, the very symbol of anti:-Communist 
defiance, Cardinal Mindszenty, whose personal popularity matched that of Nagy, was 
33Even among the staunchest anti-Communists he was known as "Imre Bdcsi," in  Hungarian a 
term of endearment that translates roughly and inadequately as "Uncle Imre." I remember vividly him 
rubbing my hair while engrossed in conversation with a Cabinet Minister during a walk with my 
mother on Andrassy Street in the summer of 1 956. 
. 
34I remember my father telling me the next morning of marching in the initial demonstration, 
coming home excitedly to tell my mother, who arrived just in time to see the statue tumble down 
35I marched in my first demonstration with my mother in Heroes Square, although I do not 
remember the exact date. 
35 
released from prison. Perhaps the most creative and novel feature of the revolution was the 
spontaneous emergence of grassroots, revolutionary workers' councils, such as the ones 
Lukacs advocated long before, that sought participatory political and economic democracy, 
efficacious participation by workers and peasants in making the decisions that shape their 
futures. As far as the American response is considered, the Voice of America, in its infinite 
sagacity concerning Hungarian politics, first encouraged Magyars not to support the 
incorrigibly Stalinist Nagy(!), then promised military support if the freedom fighters held 
on. 36 
On November 4, the final Soviet assault was launched with a vengeance. The revolution 
was defeated and the Kadar regime installed. Many buildings in Budapest, (some of the city 
still devastated from World War II), were in ruins, its little squares filled with graves. There 
were shortages of food and heating fuel. Not taking a chance on the loyalty of its troops, the 
new contingent of the Soviet army were largely illiterate Mongolians who had been told they 
were fighting a resurgence of Nazism in Germany.37 
Imre Nagy and most of the other leaders of the revolution initially took refuge in the 
Yugoslav embassy. After leaving this sanctuary, they were abducted and taken to Romania. 
At his trial, Nagy conducted himself as the legitimate Hungarian head of state, and treated 
the Soviet invasion and the trial itself as illegal. On June 1 6, 1 958,  he, Pal Maleter, the 
military hero of the revolution and a nearly sentimental Communist to the end and Miklos 
Gimes, were executed. The final words of Imre Nagy were, "Long live the socialist and 
independent Hungary!" 
v. 
The Hungarian revolution of 1956 is described by the Soviets as a reactionary, fascist, 
counter-evolution, by the United States as a conservative, anti-Communist, democratic 
capitalist, pro-Western uprising. It was neither. 
In the first place, the revolution called into question the very bipolar structure of the 
post-World War II era. With its declaration of neutrality, Hungary stated clearly its refusal 
36The latter I remember hearing on the radio. 
37My parents and I were told this by a Russian officer; the Mongolians features of the soldiers · · 
were evident. Having found out that my father would be arrested again as an "enemy of the people," 
my family decided not to stick around for such a great honor and escaped to Yugoslavia on January 
20, 1 957. 
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to be dominated by and play the political games of any superpower. 38 The revolution was 
a spontaneous, grassroots, mass movement, self-forming and self-propelled, manifesting a 
remarkable national consensus.39 It was democratic in character, anti-Communist because 
it was anti-authoritarian.40 Partly because of this anti-hierarchicalism and anti­
authoritarianism, the majority did not want a return .to the status quo ante 1 945. 
However, there is a more fundamental reason for contending that the revolution was not 
democratic capitalist in character. There can be little doubt that vast majority of Magyars 
favored ·a multi-party system and fundamental civil liberties., the freedom of speech, press, 
religion, etc., that are features of political democracy. It is equally clear that the vast 
majority also wanted economic democracy--not untramelled capitalism. 
We might remember that the Hungarian middle class was relatively small and the feudal 
structure, in spite of reforms, largely intact prior to 1 945. The economic orientation of the 
revolution can be discerned in one of its slogans, "We do not return either land or factory," 
double edged in its opposition to the return of factories and lands to either private or state 
ownership_4l Peasants· typically hoped for land redistribution and like the industrial workers 
started their own grassroots, democratic councils. 
In Hungary 1 956 Revisited, Agnes Heller and Ferenc Feher, following Hannah Arendt, 
see the revolution combining in a unique waY features of a multi-party political democracy 
with new, still developing notions of the socialization of property--economic democracy.42 
. They allude to the writings of Istvan Bibo, an anti-ommunist, non-doctrinaire socialist, who 
had joined Nagy's cabinet.43 Bibo believed that the foundations for the legitimacy of the 
government were - in the events of October, not the Stalinist Constitution of 1 949 nor the 
status quo ante 1 945.44 In his draft of a new Constitution, there were to be no limitations 
placed on civil liberties (with the exception of a tacit agreement to ban fascist parties-­
which were in effect during the elections of 1 990) nor on such small properties as peasant 
38Feher and Heller, Hungary 1 956 Revisited, p. 1 30. For a brief overview of the major events 
of the revolution, see ibid. pp. XII-XVII. The foregoing relies on this account, numerous sources 
read years ago, the exact sources no longer accessible to my memory, and my own recollections. Such 
events are not forgotten even by seven year olds! 
39 • . Ib1d. ,  pp. I -2 I ,  pp. 75-77.  
40Ibid. ,  pp. 79, 86-90. 
41Ibid. , p. 90. 
42Ibid., p. I 03. 
43Ibid., pp. 86-90, 97- 1 1 5. 
44Ibid. ?  pp. 1 2- 1 3, 84, 85-60, 92, 94, I 0 1 ,  1 57 .  
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lands and small businesses. In keeping the previously mentioned slogan, there would be no 
restoration of large estates, factories, or large enterprises.45 Bibo's document captured the 
spirit and embodied the spontaneous emergence of peasants' and workers' councils that 
sought peasants' and workers' ownership, management, and operation, in a participatory 
democratic way, of these enterprises. 46 The aborted emerging socio politico-economic system 
was a unique form of social democracy, combining elements, traditionally seen as antithetical 
by both advocates of democratic capitalism and orthodox Marxists, of multi-party political 
democracy and a system of participatory, grassroots workers' councils.47 
An additional reason for my considering the revolution social democratic instead of a 
democratic capitalist one is another national consensus, which exists to this day, aspects of 
which, as we have seen, were enacted as early as the 1 870's, concerning some of the basic 
features of the social welfare state. The overwhelming majority of Magyars, including 
royalists and former members of the nobility take for granted such measures as national 
health care and family income supplement for children. 
Imre Nagy has at times been depicted as irresolutely riding events.48 On the contrary, 
he was a symbolic focal point of the aspirations of the Hungarian people. Hardly the 
Stalinist described in the initial Voice of America broadcast, Nagy had consistently advocated 
land redistribution instead of collectivization, the separation of state authority from the party 
apparatus (foreshadowing Gorbachev), and a degree of political pluralism.49 With his self­
critical openness leading to rejection of a life long Bolshevism in favor of political pluralism, 
Heller and Feher describe Nagy as the first Eurocommunist, in effect a radical, democratic 
Eurosocialist. 50 They further describe him as "a new radical political, militant," the first 
post-Machiavellian politician who rejected superpower politics and whose consistent sincerity 
and integrity, eventually costing him his life,endeavored him to Magyars.51 In addition,  he 
was quite adept at forging consensus.52 
45Ibid., p. 1 0 1 .  
46Ibid., pp. 1 0 1 - 1 03.  
47Ibid. ,  p. 1 03 .  
48Ibid. 
49Ibid.,  p. 1 1 8.  
50Ibid.,  p. 124. 
51Ibid. ,  pp. 1 1 8 - 1 26. 
52Ibid. ,  p. 1 26. 
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While the socio-politico-economic vision of Imre Nagy is sketchy at best and was still 
developing when he fell from power, what we do know of it shows us a unique combination, 
like the revolution itself, of political democracy, pluralism, the safeguarding of civil liberties, 
direct, grassroots economic democracy, the right to private ownership of small parcels of land 
and small business, and some of the basic features of the social welfare state. He has become 
a symbol of the revolution of 1 956, illustrated by the massive outpour of affection by the 
huge crowds at his rehabilitation and public funeral on the anniversary of his death on June. 
1 6 , 1 989. The new Republic of Hungary was proclaimed on October 23, 1 989, deliberately 
timed to coincide with the first public commemoration of the revolution. 
VI. 
Contrary to Western stereotypes, there are numerous historical resources, in all their 
ambiguity, for the construction of social democracy in Hungary. Resources in the ambiguous 
role of religion in Hungarian life, and in the Marxist legacy of George Lukacs and the 
radical democratic socialism of the Budapest Circle were considered. Finally, an attempt was 
made to show, after providing a brief overview of its main events, that the revolution of 
1 956 and the soci-politico-economic vision of Imre Nagy provide the most important 
resources for the construction of social democracy in Hungary. 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe tend to be lumped together. In similar 
fashion, the collapse of Communism is treated as synonymous with the failure of socialism 
and the triumph of democratic capitalism. True to these stereotypes, the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum, the winner of the recent elections with 49% of the vote, is described as 
right of center. 
In the first place, while the countries of Central and Eastern Europe do have a shared 
history, they also differ in their histories, ethnic populations, and some semblance of a 
democratic heritage (or lack thereof). On the contemporary scene, while all of these 
countries are embarked on a path toward political and economic reform, their political 
institutions vary, and the respective pace and styles of economic reform are significantly 
diffuent. 
The political institutions of the newly emerging Hungary are democratic. As it enters the 
global economy, the mechanisms of the market are being adopted and foreign investment 
encouraged. The vast majority of Magyars realize the market is more efficient than 
centralized planning, they are critical of the nearly stereotyped indolence of workers whose 
jobs are guaranteed and the necessary bribery of medical professionals to get adequate health 
care. Nevertheless, the broad national conscensus supporting the basic features of the social 
welfare state is intact. (The Alliance of Free Democrats, which received 34% and consists 
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mostly of former dissidents, with its loosely knit eighteenth century physiocrat ideology, may 
be somewhat of an exception, although even they favored some minimal standards of social 
welfare). In some places, although it is difficult to see what impact they will have and how 
widespread they will become, workers councils are managing their own factories. Wanting 
to avoid the massive economic dislocations that are all too evident in Poland, the pace of 
economic reform is slower. 
The Hungarian Democratic Forum, with numerous wings and factions, including the 
"Greens," is a broad based political party, the only one organized in every locality. It 
combines elements of nationalism, support of democratic institutions and civil liberties, and 
features of the social welfare state, following primarily the model of Sweden. 
Hungary is basically pro-Western and pro-American (although there is a nationalist party, 
whose ideology, advocating a uniquely Hungarian "middle way," has penetrated factions of 
all political parties with the exception of the Alliance of Free Democrats). While Hungary 
was allied with Germany during the World Wars, most Magyars have traditionally been pro­
American. The intellectual leaders of the Revolution of 1 848 saw the United States as a 
beacon of hope, a ray of light, an inspiration for their aspirations. The people of the United 
States, in turn, expressed their solidarity for the struggles of the Hungarian people. This 
mutual sympathy toward each other, reinforced by the influx of a large number of 
Hungarian immigrants to the United States, is perhaps best symbolized by the gift of 
Washington's sword to Kossuth and its presence in the National Museum of Budapest to this 
day.ss 
Within the framework of this pro-Western, pro-American orientation, Hungarians are not 
uncritical of the United States and its capitalist system. There is a deep seated distrust of any 
superpower. Memories, particularly in the villages, of unscrupulous American business 
ventures that make the ugly American look beautiful linger. The impact of the influx of a 
significant number of Hungarian-American retirees, simply on account of being able to 
maintain a better standard of living in their native land, is not lost upon Hungarians. 
Although admirous of American political institutions and anxious to learn from them, 
Sweden and Finland are Hungary's economic role models, not the United States. Magyars 
do not want to replace Soviet troops with American dollars. 
In addition to political economic reforms, Hungary faces two major, pressing problems. 
One concerns the problem of "rationalities," ethnic minorities, a historically thorny problem 
that I have not addressed in this essay. One aspect of the issue today is the large number of 
ethnic Magyars in neighboring countries, particularly Transylvania, a part of Romania since 
the Treaty of Trianon, and where Ceasescu's regime practiced what amounts to cultural 
53What Hungarian child is not aware of this? What American child is? 
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genocide. During the last two years some Magyars have· wanted to declare war against 
Romania. There is little prospect of resolving the issue at this point. 
Another aspect of this question concerns the treatment of the large minority of gypsies 
in Hungary. The current government has embarked on a program of affirmative action and 
sponsored legislation to safeguard the unique ethnic culture of the Gypsy people. 
A no less pressing problem is that of environmental degradation. Scholars and politicians 
have been sent to the United States to study environmental protection legislation. As 
mentioned previously, there is a powerful Green faction, modeled after the West German 
party of that name, in the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Some Hungarian philosophers are 
studying resources in American philosophy, the pragmatism of James and Dewey and 
environmental philosophy in particular, as they seek the kind of values and vision they need 
to deal adequately with the issues surrounding environmental degradation.54 
There are resources, however, in the Hungarian national heritage that provide such values 
and vision. I am thinking of an aspect of popular piety, the deep roots of which cannot be 
underestimated, that sees the world, human and non-human, as sacramental, humans as earth 
creatures inextricably rooted in the land, the non-human natural world of value in, of, and 
for itself, with which humans were created to live in harmony - resembling what .Bernard 
E. Meland has called "mystical naturalism."55 
The vision of the new Hungary's journey toward social democracy may be best 
summarized by PetOfi's words in the "Nemzeti Dal," "We pledge, we pledge never again to be 
prisoners!"56 
54Ibid. ,  p. 1 27. 
55 At the previously mentioned conference in Washington, several of the Hungarians, including 
a prominent figure in the Hungarian Democratic Forum, spent a considerable amount of time at the 
Environmental Protection Agency. I am indebted to Dr. Janos Kelemen, Head of the Philosophy 
Department, Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, for the information pertaining to the interest in 
American Philosophy on the part of Hungarian Philosophers. 
56Meland, Bernard E.,  Modern Man's Worship: A Search for Reality in Religion (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1 934). 
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